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“Danger Is My Business”: The Right to
Manufacture Unsafe Products
Richard C. Ausness
I. INTRODUCTION
Danger Is My Business is the title of a book published in
1938 by Colonel John D. Craig, a twentieth-century explorer,
adventurer, and military figure.1 However, this phrase can also
be applied to the activities of companies that manufacture
dangerous or unsafe products. As judges2 and commentators3
have observed, products liability law is supposed to encourage
manufacturers to produce safe products by subjecting them to
liability when their products fall below an acceptable level of
safety. Nevertheless, products liability law sometimes operates
to discourage the production of safe products by shielding
manufacturers from liability when they place unsafe products on
the market.
This is not necessarily a bad policy. While no one would
dispute that safety is a desirable objective, it may not always be
an absolute priority. Rather, in some cases, other societal
interests such as personal autonomy, consumer choice, product
cost, and performance may trump legitimate safety goals. This is
reflected in some of the doctrines and defenses that have evolved
to protect the producers of unsafe products against tort liability.
Some of these doctrines, such as those determining liability for
the producers of optional safety equipment, inherently dangerous
products, products with obvious hazards, and prescription drugs


Everett H. Metcalf Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research,
University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; L.L.M. 1973 Yale
University.
1. See JOHN D. CRAIG, DANGER IS MY BUSINESS (1938).
2. See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 425 (1st Cir. 1988) (Selya, J.,
dissenting); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring); Barrett v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314 n.7 (Ct. App. 1990);
Bewers v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 666, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1982), rev’d, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 474 N.E.2d 247 (N.Y. 1984).
3. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort
Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 322 (2008).
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and medical devices, are part of the law of products liability.
Other doctrines, such as the regulatory compliance defense and
the contract specification defense, are aspects of the broader law
of torts. Finally, a few of these doctrines, such as federal
preemption and the government contractor defense, are rooted in
principles of federal supremacy.
Part II of this article begins with an examination of the
relationship between defectiveness and safety. It observes that
liability is based on the sale of a “defective” product rather than
on the sale of an unsafe one.4 In other words, the fact that a
product is not particularly safe does not necessarily mean that it
is defective.
Part III identifies a number of doctrines and defenses that
potentially shield manufacturers of unsafe products from liability.
These include federal preemption, the regulatory compliance
defense, the contract specification defense, and the government
contractor defense. Part III also observes that current products
liability law often allows manufacturers to offer safety equipment
on an optional basis, thereby enabling consumers to purchase
products that may not be optimally safe. Likewise, manufacturers
of inherently dangerous products, such as cigarettes, alcoholic
beverages, and fast food, are generally immune from liability as
long as they warn about product risks that might not be matters of
common knowledge. Furthermore, under the obvious hazard
rule, the duty to warn does not extend to hazards that should be
known to the average consumer. In addition, the Products
Liability Restatement, along with most courts, has declined to
impose strict liability on the sellers of used products. Finally,
certain potentially dangerous products, such as prescription
drugs, vaccines, and medical devices, receive special treatment in
products liability law because of their high social value.
Part IV examines a number of societal interests that may
sometimes prevail over safety goals. Personal autonomy and
consumer choice are two closely related interests. The principle
of personal autonomy respects the right of individuals to engage

4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (“One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes
a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect.”).
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in risky activities and to purchase dangerous products.5 In
addition, public policy supports the proposition that consumers
should have access to a wide range of options when they purchase
products, including ones that are cheaper, but less safe.6 Product
cost and performance are also important considerations that must
be balanced against product safety. Additional safety features
often increase product cost and, consequently, may price some
consumers out of the market. In addition, as anyone who has
struggled with child-proof caps knows, safety features sometimes
adversely affect convenience and product performance.7 Safety
must sometimes be compromised in order to protect
governmental interests such as military procurement or agency
decision-making. Finally, sub-optimal safety is sometimes
tolerated in order to protect sellers from liability, as was the case
when airbags were phased in gradually instead of being required
all at once.
II. HOW SAFE DOES A PRODUCT HAVE TO BE?
A. Is Product Safety Really “Job One?”
Undoubtedly, safety is a popular and important societal goal.
For example, the term “safety” appears prominently in the names
of federal agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety
Commission and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. In addition, Congress has placed the words
“safe” or “safety” in the titles of various pieces of federal
legislation. These include the Safe Drinking Water Act,8 the
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003,9 the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act,10 the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970,11 the Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa

5. See Peter L. Berger, Furtive Smokers—and What They Tell Us About America,
COMMENTARY, June 1994, at 21, 26 (“[A] strong tradition of individual autonomy has
existed in America . . . .”).
6. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1283-84 (1980).
7. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1154 (1996).
8. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012).
9. Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
10. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2012).
11. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012).
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Safety Act,12 the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994,13 the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,14 and the
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of
2011,15 just to name a few.
Consequently, one would expect product manufacturers to
embrace the idea of safety as well, and indeed they have. For
years, product sellers have gone to great lengths to assure the
public of the safety and reliability of their products. Some have
even included the words “safe” or “safety” as part of a product’s
name,16 or even as part of the company’s name,17 to suggest that
these products are benign and pose no threat to life or limb.
Unfortunately, product manufacturers do not always practice
what they preach.18 Despite all this talk of safety, many products
currently on the market are not particularly safe, and some are
downright dangerous. Nevertheless, manufacturers continue to
produce and sell these dangerous products with impunity.
B. What Do We Mean by “Safety”?
The term safety has a number of different meanings. For
example, the dictionary defines safety as “the condition of being
safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or loss.”19
However, other definitions of safety may be more appropriate to
products liability law.
One such definition focuses on
technological feasibility. To satisfy a feasibility standard,
manufacturers must produce products that are as safe as they

12. Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8001–8007 (2012).
13. Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-440 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
14. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 7625, 42 U.S.C. § 280g-16, and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
15. Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, 49 U.S.C. §§
60138-60140 (2012).
16. See, e.g., Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. 1945) (noting cleaning
fluid named “Safety-Kleen” produced deadly tetrachloride fumes).
17. See, e.g., GARDEN SAFE PRODUCTS, http://www.gardensafe.com (last visited Oct.
3, 2014); SAFE HOME PRODUCTS, http://www.safehomeproducts.com (last visited Oct. 3,
2014); SAFETY-KLEEN, http://www.safety-kleen.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014);
SKATE SAFE PRODUCTS, http://www.skatesafeproducts.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
18. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932) (holding
manufacturer’s claim that the glass in its windshield was “so made that it will not fly or
shatter under the hardest impact” was false and constituted a breach of express warranty).
19. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1036 (1983).
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could be in light of current technology.20 Some federal statutes
also mandate safety levels based on a feasibility standard.21
Although this standard is commonly embodied in statutory safety
standards, only a few state courts have endorsed it for purposes of
products liability.22 A more popular standard is optimal safety.
This efficiency-based standard, discussed in more detail below,
requires manufacturers to make cost-effective investments in
product safety. It should be noted that the level of safety
necessary to satisfy an optimality standard may be less than the
level of safety required by the feasibility standard since a safety
feature that is feasible may not necessarily be cost-effective.
Finally, a level of safety may be legally sufficient even though it
is less than optimal. These sorts of sub-optimally safe products
are the principal focus of this article.
C. Safety and Tort Liability
The relationship between product safety, however defined,
and products liability has always been somewhat obscure. For
example, when the Restatement (Second) of Torts was first
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1965, it imposed
strict liability in tort on the sellers of “defective” and
“unreasonably dangerous” products.23 However, comments
suggested that these terms were the same, or nearly the same, by
defining both as products that were more dangerous than an
ordinary consumer would expect them to be.24 This “consumer
expectation” test was derived from warranty law and seemed to
20. Cf. Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 696 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“While a manufacturer has a duty to design a product that is reasonably safe for its
foreseeable use, it is not required to design the ‘best possible product,’ and ‘proof that
technology existed, which if implemented could feasibly have avoided a dangerous
condition, does not alone establish a defect.’” (quoting Sexton ex rel Sexton v. Bell Helmets,
Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1991))).
21. See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That
Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118 (2001) (discussing
Occupational Health and Safety Act safety standards).
22. See, e.g., Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985), vacated in part, 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Indianapolis Athletic Club v. Alco
Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Falada v. Trinity Indus., Inc.,
642 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2002); AC&S, Inc. v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 254 (Md. 1996);
Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
Johnson v. Salem Corp., 477 A.2d 1246, 1251-52 (N.J. 1984); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co.,
683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. See id. § 402A cmts. g, i.
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indicate that liability should be based on deception of consumers
rather than upon a manufacturer’s failure to meet a particular
standard of product safety.25 Furthermore, by imposing liability
only upon manufacturers whose products were “unreasonably
dangerous,” the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
seemed to imply that manufacturers and others who produced or
sold reasonably dangerous products would not be subject to tort
liability.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that liability under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not based on whether a
product was safe or unsafe in any sort of absolute sense. Instead,
liability depended upon whether a product was reasonably safe.
But what does reasonably safe mean in this context? One
possibility is that it is equivalent to technological feasibility, at
least in design defect cases. Under this definition, in order to
avoid liability, a manufacturer would have to make a product as
safe as current technology permits. Although some “state-of-theart” cases seemed to have taken this position,26 reasonable safety
eventually became identified more with optimality than with
feasibility.
Influenced by law and economics theorists, courts and legal
scholars in the 1980s began to view product safety in resourceallocation terms and concluded that manufacturers should spend
money on risk-reduction measures only up to the point where the
marginal cost of achieving further risk reduction would equal or
exceed the marginal benefits of such reduction.27 Imposing
liability on the party in the best position to make this

25. The concept of an unreasonably dangerous product, as defined by the consumer
expectation test, was replaced by the deviation-from-the-norm test in manufacturing defect
cases. See, e.g., McKenzie v. S K Hand Tool Corp., 650 N.E.2d 612, 615-20 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995). Under this approach, a product is considered to be defective if it deviates from the
manufacturer’s intended design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2(a) (1998). Of course, there is no guarantee that the design in question will
not be unreasonably dangerous, but that question will not arise in a manufacturing defect
case.
26. See, e.g., Indianapolis Athletic Club, 709 N.E.2d at 1074; AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d
at 254; O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983).
27. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 865 (1984).
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determination would ensure that an “efficient” or “optimal” level
of product safety would be achieved.28
For the most part, this approach has been retained by the
drafters of the Products Liability Restatement. For example,
section 2(b) declares that a product “is defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design.”29 In addition, comment a expressly adopts
optimal safety as a goal by pointing out that in subsections (b) and
(c), which deal with design defect and failure-to-warn claims,
respectively, “[t]he emphasis is on creating incentives for
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and
marketing products.”30 The comment continues, “[s]ociety does
not benefit from products that are excessively safe . . . any more
than it benefits from products that are too risky.”31 Rather,
“[s]ociety benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of
product safety is achieved.”32
All of this suggests the “reasonable alternative design” or the
“reasonable instructions or warnings” are designs or warnings
that are optimal, or sufficient, to achieve a marginal level of
accident cost reduction that exceeds their marginal cost. This
means that manufacturers need not make their products as safe as
current technology permits; instead, they are merely required to
spend money on product safety so long as the marginal cost of
additional safety measures is less than the expected reduction of
product-related accident costs.33
Nevertheless, having identified an optimal level of product
safety as the standard for avoiding tort liability, the drafters of the
Products Liability Restatement seem to have retreated from this
position. Comment f to section 2, which identifies various factors
relevant to determining whether an alternative design is
reasonable, mentions a number of factors unrelated to safety.
28. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176 n.42 (1998)
(“‘[E]fficiently safe products,’ [are] products for which manufacturers have made all costjustified investments in safety. ‘Inefficiently unsafe products’ are those for which not all such
investments have been made.”).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
30. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Henderson, supra note 27, at 768.
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These include the likely effects of the alternative design on
product maintenance, repair, and aesthetics, as well as the range
of consumer choice among products.34 In theory, these
considerations could trump safety concerns and allow a less safe
design to pass muster, even if a safer design was both feasible and
cost effective.
More importantly, the Products Liability Restatement also
retains a number of doctrines that potentially allow manufacturers
to escape tort liability despite the fact that their products are not
optimally safe. These include provisions for optional safety
equipment,35 protection for inherently dangerous products,36 and
reduced liability for manufacturers and sellers of prescription
drugs and medical devices.37 In addition, a number of other
common-law doctrines and defenses, not expressly mentioned in
the Products Liability Restatement, also allow for the production
and sale of products that are less than optimally safe.
III. DOCTRINES AND DEFENSES ALLOWING FOR
SUB-OPTIMAL SAFETY
Manufacturers may invoke a number of specific doctrines
and defenses to escape liability for injuries to consumers caused
by products with sub-optimal levels of safety. These doctrines
involve such concepts as federal preemption, compliance with
state-of-the-art, optional safety equipment, and obvious hazards.
In addition, special rules applicable to inherently dangerous
products and prescription drugs arguably permit manufacturers to
produce and sell products that are not optimally safe.
A. Federal Preemption
Although the states are considered to be sovereign entities
under the United States Constitution,38 Congress has the authority
to preempt state law in the exercise of its constitutional powers
when it chooses to do so.39 This power to preempt state law
derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998).
See id. § 2 cmt. f, illus. 10.
See id. § 2 cmt. d.
Id. § 6.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
See id. at 460.
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Constitution.40 The federal power to preempt not only applies to
state statutes;41 it extends to local ordinances as well.42
Furthermore, in recent decades, product manufacturers have
successfully invoked principles of federal preemption in order to
negate the effect of state products liability doctrines.43
Courts44 and commentators45 usually distinguish between
express and implied preemption. Express preemption occurs
when a federal statute specifically excludes state regulation in a
particular area.46 A number of federal statutes contain express
preemption provisions.47 In addition, federal agencies, when
acting within the scope of their delegated authority, may
expressly preempt state law by regulation.48 Furthermore,
Congress may impliedly preempt state law. One form of implied
preemption occurs when a state attempts to regulate in an area
that involves a dominant federal interest such as foreign affairs,49
or when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that it

40. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 63 (1941); see also U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
41. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992);
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Mich. Canners & Freezers
Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984).
42. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973).
43. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000).
44. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Hillsborough Cnty. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985).
45. See Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the
Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 25 (2005); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 414 (2003).
46. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983); Ry. Employes’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
232 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1947).
47. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (2012) (preempting certain state motor vehicle
standards).
48. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (granting the
Federal Communications Commission broad authority to regulate cable communications
systems); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (preempting
state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses in loan agreements); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,
667-68 (1962) (holding a savings bond right of survivorship is enforceable regardless of state
law); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958) (ruling
federal policy governing shipping rates for common carriers expressly preempted conflicting
state policy).
49. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941).
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occupies the field and leaves no room for state regulation.50
Another form of preemption, known as conflict preemption,
occurs either when it is impossible to comply with conflicting
state and federal laws,51 or when state law stands as an obstacle
to the achievement of federal regulatory objectives.52
Legal scholars agree that preemption analysis requires a
court to ascertain congressional intent.53 However, this is easier
said than done. When a federal statute contains an express
preemption provision, it is clear that Congress intended to
preempt state law to some extent, and the court’s job is to
determine the scope of the statute’s preemptive language.54
Determining congressional intent is more difficult in implied
preemption situations where there is no specific preemptive
language to examine. Thus, the court must examine the statute’s
regulatory structure and purpose to determine whether Congress
intended for the federal regulatory scheme to co-exist with state
regulatory provisions.55
If state law requires manufacturers to achieve an optimal
level of safety and federal law allows them to get away with a
lower, sub-optimal level of safety, the doctrine of federal
preemption, if applicable, will ensure that the lower level of safety
prevails. One might ask why Congress would permit, or even
mandate, the manufacture of products that were not optimally
safe. In most cases, the answer is that Congress has subordinated
product safety to the achievement of a more important federal
objective.
This conflict between product safety and other congressional
objectives is nicely illustrated by Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.56 In Cipollone, the personal representative of a deceased
50. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
51. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913).
52. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987); Mich. Canners &
Freezers Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984); Ark. La. Gas
Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 584 (1981).
53. See Jonathan V. O’Steen & Van O’Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the
Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective
Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 70 (2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455 (2008).
54. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C.
L. REV. 967, 970 (2002).
55. See Mary J. Davis, On Restating Products Liability Preemption, 74 BROOK. L.
REV. 759, 761-62 (2009).
56. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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smoker brought suit against a tobacco company, claiming that its
products caused her death from lung cancer.57 The plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that the warnings on cigarette labels did not
adequately inform consumers about the health risks of smoking.58
However, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
express provisions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1969, but not its predecessor enacted in 1965,
barred tort claims against tobacco companies based on their
failure to provide stronger warnings about the health risks of
smoking.59
Given the knowledge at the time about the health risks of
smoking, particularly the risk of lung cancer, the warnings
mandated by the federal statutes were manifestly inadequate.60
Therefore, preempting failure-to-warn claims immunized
cigarette companies from liability and allowed them to
manufacture products with sub-optimal health warnings. Why
would Congress allow cigarette companies to market such
products? As the Court observed, Congress had objectives, other
than protecting public health, in mind when it enacted the
cigarette labeling legislation.61 To be sure, one objective was to
warn the public about the health risks of smoking.62 However,
another objective was to “protect[] the national economy from the
burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations.”63 This goal of uniformity
was presumably intended to protect the economic interests of the
tobacco industry against stricter state regulation. Ostensibly,
these same considerations motivated Congress to enact a revised
cigarette labeling law when the original Act expired in 1969.

57. Id. at 508. The smoker and her husband originally brought the action, and it was
continued after their deaths by their son on behalf of both estates. Id. at 509.
58. Id. at 508.
59. Id. at 530-31. However, the Court held that the 1969 Act did not preempt claims
based on breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. Id. at 531. Nor were
any claims preempted based on the defendant’s failure to provide any health warnings prior
to 1965. Id. at 518-20.
60. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy,
and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 908-09 (1988); Lars
Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to
Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 304 (1994).
61. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514.
62. Id. (stating statute sought to “adequately inform[] the public that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health”).
63. Id.
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Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.64 also illustrates the
tension between safety and non-safety objectives. The plaintiff
in Geier was injured when her 1987 Honda Accord struck a tree.65
She brought suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the
vehicle was defectively designed because it was not equipped
with an airbag on the driver’s side.66 In response, the
manufacturer contended that the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act67 and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 (“FMVSS 208”), promulgated by the Department of
Transportation under the authority of the Act, preempted the
plaintiff’s “no airbag” claim.68 The manufacturer maintained that
the plaintiff’s automobile complied with the requirements of
FMVSS 208, which did not require it to install airbags.69
Although the federal statute contained an expresspreemption provision, it did not specifically apply to state-law tort
claims.70 In addition, it contained a savings clause that appeared
to preserve common-law remedies.71 Consequently, the Court
concluded that it should interpret the preemption provision
narrowly72 and ruled that the Act did not expressly preempt the
plaintiff’s tort claim against the manufacturer.73 Having rejected
the defendant’s express-preemption argument, the Court then
considered the argument that the plaintiff’s claim was impliedly
preempted on conflict grounds.74 Addressing this issue, the Court
declared that FMVSS 208 “deliberately sought a gradual phasein of passive restraints” in annual increments over a three-year
period.75 This phase-in process was supposed to allow more time
for manufacturers to improve airbag technology or to develop
other passive restraint systems.76 In the Court’s view, the
plaintiff’s lawsuit was predicated on the notion that the defendant
64. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
65. Id. at 865.
66. Id.
67. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381–
1431 (1988) (repealed 1994). The Act was later recodified. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30183
(2012).
68. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865-66.
69. Id. at 865.
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994).
72. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
73. Id. at 867-68.
74. Id. at 869.
75. Id. at 879.
76. Id.
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had a duty to equip all of its 1987 vehicles with airbags.77
However, the Court concluded that holding the defendant liable
on this basis “would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual
passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately
imposed.”78
In two recent cases, the Court held that certain provisions of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act79 relating to the
licensing of generic drugs impliedly preempted common-law
claims.80 The first, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,81 involved the
generic drug metoclopramide, which is commonly used to treat
certain digestive tract problems.82 The FDA approved the drug in
1980 under the brand name Reglan, and the other manufacturers
began generic production five years later.83 However, as early as
1985, the FDA and the drug manufacturers became aware that
long-term use of metoclopramide could cause tardive dyskinesia,
a severe neurological disorder.84
The plaintiffs in Mensing developed tardive dyskinesia after
taking a generic version of metoclopramide for several years.85
They alleged that warnings provided by the manufacturers of
metoclopramide failed to adequately warn about the danger of
contracting tardive dyskinesia from long-term use of the drug.86
In response, the defendant manufacturers argued that the
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal law.87
The defendants’ preemption claim relied on the provisions
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which governed FDA
licensing of generic drugs.88 The Act allowed drug manufacturers
to secure approval of generic drugs simply by showing that their
product was equivalent to a “listed” drug that had already been

77. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
78. Id.
79. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301–399f (2012).
80. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not contain a generally applicable
express preemption provision. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption:
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007).
81. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
82. Id. at 2572.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2573.
86. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
87. Id.
88. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
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approved by the FDA.89 The Court stated this meant that the
generic drug’s chemical ingredients and labeling had to be
identical to that of the listed drug.90 This requirement sought to
enable manufacturers to inexpensively market generic drugs by
exempting them from the costly process of conducting duplicative
clinical trials or other drug testing before seeking FDA
approval.91
The defendants and the FDA argued that generic drug
manufacturers were not permitted to unilaterally strengthen the
warnings that had been approved by the FDA for the listed drug.92
The Court agreed and declared that it was impossible for the drug
companies to comply with both the federal labeling requirements
and the duty to warn under the state law about newly discovered
product risks.93 Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs’
failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted.94
The Court reached a similar result in Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Bartlett.95 This case involved sulindac, a pain reliever
approved by the FDA in 1978 under the brand name Clinoril.96
Unfortunately, sulindac caused serious hypersensitivity skin
reactions in a small number of users.97 In December 2004, the
plaintiff took sulindac for shoulder pain and developed toxic
epidermal necrolysis, which resulted in disfigurement, a number
of physical disabilities, and near blindness.98 At the time, the
drug’s label warned that the drug could cause skin reactions or
death but it did not state that it could cause specific conditions
such as toxic epidermal necrolysis.99 The plaintiff brought suit
against a generic manufacturer of sulindac, alleging failure to
warn and defective design.100 The failure-to-warn claim was
dismissed on causation grounds, but the plaintiff ultimately
89. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
90. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(A) (2012) (relevant
statutory provision).
91. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
92. Id. at 2574-75.
93. Id. at 2577-78.
94. Id. at 2581.
95. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
96. Id. at 2471.
97. Id. at 2471-72.
98. Id. at 2472.
99. Id. However, toxic epidermal necrolysis was listed as a “potential adverse
reaction” on the drug’s package insert. Id.
100. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
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prevailed on the design defect claim.101 However, on appeal, the
United States Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of Mensing
to conclude that the plaintiff’s design defect claim was also
preempted.102
The Court observed that under state law, a drug
manufacturer had a duty to reduce the risk of danger from a drug’s
side effects either by changing the chemical composition of the
drug or by altering the drug’s labeling.103 Since it was not
possible to change sulindac’s chemical composition, the only way
for the manufacturer to reduce the risk of its side effects was to
strengthen the drug’s warnings.104 However, because sulindac
was a generic drug, the manufacturer could not change its labeling
either.105
Therefore, because it was impossible for the
manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law
requirements, state law was necessarily preempted.106
By preempting the plaintiffs’ tort claims in Mensing and
Bartlett, the Court enabled the generic drug companies to market
their products without fear of liability, even though the warnings
they provided might have been inadequate. Apparently, the Court
believed that it was more important to uphold the FDA’s uniform
labeling policy for generic drugs than it was to encourage
manufacturers of these products to improve their warnings.
B. The Contract Specification Defense
The contract specification defense provides that a
manufacturer will not be held liable for a design defect when it
manufactures a product in accordance with the buyer’s plans and
specifications.107 “As the contract specification defense is
grounded on the theory of reasonable reliance, the contractor is
not protected by the defense if he follows specifications that” are
obviously dangerous.108 However, since the “average contractor
cannot be expected to possess the expertise needed to examine
101. Id.
102. See id. at 2478-80.
103. Id. at 2474.
104. Id.
105. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476.
106. Id. at 2477.
107. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
108. See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor Defense:
Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998).
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every design” that is proposed by a potential customer, a
contractor should ordinarily be able to “rely on a third-party’s
design specifications without fear of liability.”109
Although the contract specification doctrine first appeared in
negligence cases,110 it has also been applied with some frequency
in products liability cases.111 Moon v. Winger Boss Co.112 is
illustrative. In Moon, a worker was injured when his arm became
109. Id. at 410; see also Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir.
1985) (affirming judgment for vaccine manufacturer whose product met detailed
specifications of government contract); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D.
Kan. 1983) (denying summary judgment in negligence claim because essential facts to the
contract specification defense remained controverted); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co.,
221 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (allowing defense where contractor was not
negligent and merely carried out contract plans and specifications in building chemical
exhaust apparatus).
110. See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1973)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant crane manufacturer on negligence claim
where manufacturer followed industrial buyer’s plans and specifications); Moran v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 914-17 (3d Cir. 1948) (allowing trier of fact
to determine liability where manufacturer planned the construction of a structure that later
caused damage to plaintiff); Md. Cas. Co. v. Indep. Metal Prods. Co., 99 F. Supp. 862, 868
(D. Neb. 1951) (noting that the defendant did not fail to exercise reasonable care in planning
a product where a third party determined the product’s design and specifications), aff’d, 203
F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 243 N.W. 387, 387-88 (Minn.
1932) (discussing whether a buyer’s reliance on a seller’s “more expert and dependable
knowledge” of stove construction details shielded the buyer from contributory negligence);
Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171-72 (App. Div. 1992)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant who complied with purchaser’s design
specifications).
111. See, e.g., Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974)
(refusing to hold a manufacturer liable for defective design in products liability case where
manufacturer was not the designer); Housand v. Bra-Con Indus., 751 F. Supp. 541, 544-45
(D. Md. 1990) (barring products liability claim where none of the defendants designed or
engineered the automobile assembly line where plaintiff was injured); Lesnefsky v. Fischer
& Porter Co., 527 F. Supp. 951, 953-56 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding manufacturer of brewery
cooking device not liable for injury caused by design defect where manufacturer followed
experienced purchaser’s specifications); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 502 F. Supp.
173, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (addressing manufacturer’s defense in products liability case where
helicopter component part was made to the specifications of a third party); McCabe Powers
Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 593-94 (Ky. 1980) (allowing defense to products
liability claim where defendant constructed “cherry picker” in accordance with buyer’s
detailed specifications); Bloemer v. Art Welding Co. Inc., 884 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (holding “a contractor’s compliance with its customer’s plans and specifications is . .
. a complete defense to strict liability and negligence claims based on defective design”). But
see, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing
to allow defense in products liability case where manufacturer was not in control of design
but followed government buyer’s design specifications), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1975);
Hendricks v. Comerio Ercole, 763 F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (D. Kan. 1991) (refusing to shield
manufacturer from liability for design defects where manufacturer followed buyer’s plans
and specifications).
112. 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980).
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entangled in the sprocket and chain of a moving breaking table.113
The specifications provided by the plaintiff’s employer did not
provide for protective guards, which left the chain mechanism
exposed.114 The plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively
designed,115 but the court concluded that the manufacturer was
not liable if it manufactured the product in accordance with the
employer’s plans and specifications, assuming they were not
“obviously, patently, or glaringly dangerous.”116
A Missouri appellate court reached a similar result in
Bloemer v. Art Welding Co.117 In the case, two employees were
injured while they were cleaning a three-story-tall cylindrical tank
known as a “cyclone.”118 The defendant constructed the machine
according to specifications provided by the plaintiffs’
employer.119 The plaintiffs claimed that various design defects
caused them to be burned by hot water trapped inside the cyclone
when they attempted to open its access door.120 Affirming the
lower court’s judgment for the manufacturer, the court applied the
contract specification doctrine to shield the product manufacturer
from liability.121
Although the contract specification defense is based on the
notion that it is unfair to hold a manufacturer liable for a product’s
defective design when the manufacturer had no role in designing
the product,122 by immunizing a manufacturer from liability in all
but the most egregious cases, the doctrine arguably reduces
incentives to produce a safe product.
C. Government Contractor Defense
The government contractor defense protects a manufacturer
from liability when its product complies with design
specifications set forth in a government procurement contract.123
The defense was originally invoked by public-works contractors
113. Id. at 431.
114. Id. at 431-32.
115. Id. at 432.
116. Id. at 434.
117. 884 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
118. Id. at 56-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 59.
122. See Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974).
123. See Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d,
755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985).
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to bar negligence claims against them for damage to land and
other property.124 Later, defense contractors began to rely on this
defense to defeat claims brought against them by third parties for
injuries caused by defectively designed products supplied to the
military.125 Prior to 1988, there was some uncertainty about the
nature and scope of the government contractor defense.126
However, these issues were resolved that year by the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp.127
The decedent in Boyle, a United States Marine Corps pilot,
drowned when his helicopter crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
during a training exercise.128 The pilot’s personal representative
brought suit against Sikorsky, the manufacturer of the aircraft,
alleging that its emergency escape hatch system was defectively
designed.129 The plaintiff claimed that the hatch door was
defective because it was designed to open outward and, therefore,
could not be opened because of water pressure if the helicopter
crashed at sea.130 The plaintiff also claimed that when one of the
control sticks was pulled fully up, it interfered with the pilot’s
access to the escape hatch.131 A jury awarded damages to the
plaintiff, but the judgment was reversed on appeal.132 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was
barred by what it called the “military contractor defense.”133
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
first considered whether federal law would relieve a government

124. See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940); Green v.
ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1264 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
125. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1985); Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d
844, 844-45 (11th Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1985);
Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 598-600 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d. at 353;
McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983).
126. See Richard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense
and Products Liability, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1014 (1986) (“[A] number of issues must still
be resolved before the specific dimensions of the government contract defense are fully
revealed.”).
127. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
128. Id. at 502.
129. Id. at 503.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
133. Id. at 415.
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contractor of any state-law duty regarding product design.134 The
Court determined that procurement decisions by the federal
government were discretionary functions under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.135 Further, the Court held that the procurement of
products and services by the federal government was a unique
federal interest and, therefore, those who contracted with the
federal government to supply these goods and services should
also be exempt from liability.136 Without such protection, when
state standards and federal product-design requirements differed,
federal contractors would be forced to choose between complying
with the requirements of state law or designing their products
according to the specifications provided by the federal
government.137
This conflict would adversely affect the
procurement process because if government contractors were
subject to liability under state law, they might decline to
manufacture a product according to the design specified by the
government, or they might raise the price for such products in
order to pay prospective design defect claims.138
Having concluded that federal contractors should receive
some protection from liability under state tort law, the Court
adopted the test formulated by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.139
Under this approach, a court should not impose tort liability for
design defects in military equipment if: (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications for the product; (2) the
equipment in question conformed to these specifications; and (3)
the military contractor warned procurement officers about any
product-related risks known to the supplier but not known to
government officials.140
Safety may not be the primary concern of designers of
military hardware. Often, cost is an important consideration, and,
therefore, government procurement officers must forego
expensive safety features in order to stay within budget. In
addition, it is sometimes necessary to reject a safer alternative
134. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
135. Id. at 511.
136. Id. at 504-06.
137. See id. at 509.
138. Id. at 507.
139. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp. 792 F.2d 413, 414
(4th Cir. 1986) (articulating Fourth Circuit test); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d
444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (articulating Ninth Circuit test).
140. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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because it will adversely affect the performance of the product’s
military mission. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.141 provides a good
illustration of this trade-off between safety and performance. In
Sanner, the plaintiff was injured when a military jeep in which he
was riding was struck by another vehicle.142 The jeep did not
overturn, but the plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle because
it was not equipped with seat belts.143 The plaintiff alleged that
the jeep was defective because it was manufactured without
seatbelts or other restraints.144 Although the United States Army
considered equipping its jeeps with seat belts, it eventually
rejected the idea because “when used in certain tactical situations
they could compromise the occupants by deterring immediate
egress and escape from the vehicle.”145 A New Jersey court ruled
in favor of the manufacturer, even though the installation of seat
belts would have made the vehicle much safer in most accident
situations.146
The government contractor defense validates the
government’s decision to accept greater product risk than
necessary in order to achieve other objectives. Unfortunately, it
also shifts the risk of product-related injuries from those who
design and manufacture dangerous products to those who are
injured by them.
D. Optional Safety Equipment
The legal rules governing optional safety equipment also
allow manufacturers to design and sell products that are not as
safe as they could be. Courts and commentators have offered
several reasons for allowing manufacturers to provide safety
equipment to consumers on an optional basis.147 First, as a matter
of personal autonomy, consumers who have a higher tolerance for
risk should be able to purchase products with fewer safety
features if they choose, just as they are allowed to engage in
141. 364 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
142. Id. at 43-44.
143. Id. at 44.
144. Id. at 43-44.
145. Id. at 44.
146. See Sanner, 364 A.2d at 45.
147. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Risky Business: Liability of Product Sellers
Who Offer Safety Devices as Optional Equipment, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 807 (2011); James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Optional Safety Devices: Delegating Product Design
Responsibility to the Market, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1399 (2013).
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unavoidably risky activities. It follows that consumers should
also be able to purchase cheaper versions of a product in order to
save money for other purposes. In addition, some consumers may
be better risk bearers because they are more intelligent or more
skilled, or because they have a greater capacity to spread the risk
of injury through insurance. Finally, when a product is designed
for multiple uses, the consumer, rather than the manufacturer, will
be better able to determine which safety devices are necessary for
the consumer’s intended use.
Over the years, courts have applied various approaches to
decide when a manufacturer should be allowed to offer safety
equipment to consumers on an optional basis. A number of early
cases avoided any direct consideration of the issue and instead
focused on whether the product was defective as sold.148 Miller
v. Dvornik149 illustrates this approach. In Miller, the plaintiff was
injured when his motorcycle was struck by an automobile.150 The
plaintiff alleged that the motorcycle was defective because it was
not equipped with safety crash bars.151 The manufacturer
apparently offered crash bars as an option.152 Affirming the lower
court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim against the retail
seller of the motorcycle, the court declared that the mere
availability of optional safety equipment was not relevant to
whether the product, as sold, was unreasonably dangerous.153
However, other courts have recognized that the availability
of optional safety equipment constitutes a defense in some
circumstances. For example, in Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building
Co.,154 a New York court determined that the purchaser of a
motorcycle was in the best position to decide whether to purchase
optional side crash bars.155 The plaintiff, who was injured when
he struck a parked car, argued that the motorcycle was defectively
148. See Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 1999); Nettles
v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574, 1578-80 (11th Cir. 1986); Tannenbaum v. Yale
Materials Handling Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (D. Md. 1999); Beron v. Kramer-Trenton
Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.
2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1981); Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 669 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748-49 (App.
Div. 1998); Coleman v. Cintas Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544, 548-49 (Tex. App. 2001).
149. 501 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
150. Id. at 161-62.
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 163-64.
154. 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1981), aff’d, 434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982).
155. Id. at 483.
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designed because the manufacturer failed to provide side crash
bars as standard equipment.156 The court, however, concluded
that the consumer’s knowledge of the risk was an important factor
in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous due
to its lack of optional, as opposed to standard, safety
equipment.157
Other courts distinguish between single-purpose and multipurpose products, allowing manufacturers to offer safety devices
as options for multi-purpose products, but not for single- purpose
products.158 One of the first cases to adopt this approach was
Turney v. Ford Motor Co.159 In Turney, the plaintiff, who was
injured after being ejected from a tractor, alleged that the tractor
was unreasonably dangerous because it was not equipped with a
“roll-over protection system,” which usually consists of a roll bar
and seatbelt.160 The court observed that the tractor was multifunctional and was sold for use in a variety of workplace
environments, some of which had low clearances not suitable for
tractors with roll bars.161 Accordingly, the court held that it was
proper for the lower court to allow the manufacturer to introduce
evidence of the tractor’s multi-purpose nature as a factor for the
jury to consider in determining whether it was unreasonably
dangerous.162
A Texas court applied the same approach in Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Kunze.163 Therein, the purchaser of a ten-inch radial
power saw contended that the saw was defectively designed
because it was not equipped with a lower blade guard.164 The
manufacturer claimed that because consumers used the saw to
make many different kinds of cuts, it was difficult to design a

156. Id. at 481.
157. Id. at 482-83.
158. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984). This should
be distinguished from the situation in which a manufacturer is allowed to sell a multi-purpose
product without any safety devices, thereby shifting the responsibility to the buyer to
purchase safety devices from another vendor that are appropriate for the product’s intended
use. See Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978);
Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 775-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). But see
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 284-85 (N.J. 1972).
159. 418 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
160. Id. at 1082 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. at 1083.
162. Id.
163. 996 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App. 1999).
164. Id. at 421-22.
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lower blade guard that would protect all users in every case.165
However, the court was not persuaded by this argument and
affirmed the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff.166
Finally, some courts may opt for the multi-factor analysis
first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Scarangella
v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc.167 and subsequently followed in
several other cases.168 In Scarangella, a school bus driver was
struck by another school bus that was backing up.169 The plaintiff
maintained that the bus was defectively designed because it was
not equipped with a back-up alarm system.170 The school bus
manufacturer offered this device as optional equipment, but the
plaintiff’s employer declined to purchase it.171 Affirming a lower
court judgment in favor of the defendant, the court declared that
three factors must be shown to exist before a manufacturer can
shift responsibility for making safety decisions to a purchaser: (1)
the buyer is knowledgeable about the product and is aware of
available safety features; (2) there are some uses for which it is
not unreasonably dangerous without the optional safety
equipment; and (3) the buyer can balance the risks and benefits of
not purchasing the safety device in question, given the buyer’s
contemplated use of the product.172 The court found that all of
these factors were present and, therefore, held that the bus was
not defective.173
It is obvious that allowing manufacturers to offer safety
devices as optional equipment may lead to a sub-optimal level of
product safety for some purchasers. First, consumers may decline
to purchase optional safety equipment because they erroneously
believe that they can safely encounter the risk. Second, many
products are purchased by employers or others who will not

165. Id. at 422.
166. Id. at 420.
167. 717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999).
168. See, e.g., Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods. Inc., 909 N.E.2d 563, 566-67
(N.Y. 2009); Campbell v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App. Div.
2006); Beemer v. Deere & Co., 794 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 2005); Bova v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (App. Div. 2003); Geddes v. Crown Equip. Corp., 709
N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 2000).
169. Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 680.
170. Id. at 681.
171. Id. at 680.
172. Id. at 683.
173. Id. at 683-84.
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actually use them.174 By refusing to purchase optional safety
equipment, buyers benefit by saving money, but the increased risk
of injury falls upon employees or other users.175
E. Inherently Dangerous Products
Virtually all products are capable of causing harm if they are
not used properly.176 However, there are products that are
“inherently hazardous,” even when used properly, “because of
their inescapable, generic risks.”177 Some of these products are
dangerous in their natural state, like certain types of
mushrooms,178 or Dasheen root, which is poisonous in its
uncooked state.179 Others, such as butter, bacon, cigarettes,
alcoholic beverages, or hamburgers, come from natural products
that are processed before being sold to consumers.180 Finally,
there are manufactured products, such as all-terrain vehicles,
above-ground swimming pools, and explosives or firearms,
which also pose a serious risk of injury to users and bystanders.181
In general, manufacturers are not liable under strict liability
principles for selling inherently dangerous products to the public
as long as they provide adequate warnings about latent inherent
risks.182 The traditional rationale for this lenient treatment was
that inherently dangerous products, when accompanied by
appropriate warnings, were not unreasonably dangerous or
defective.183 This can be traced back to comment i in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which declared that
such inherently dangerous products as “[g]ood whiskey,” “[g]ood
tobacco,” and “[g]ood butter” were not unreasonably dangerous
174. See James A. Henderson, Jr., The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort: Promoting
Private Solutions to Risk-Management Problems, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 252 n.169
(2013).
175. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1274-75 (1991).
176. David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 KY. L.J. 377, 377 (2004).
177. Id. at 378.
178. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
179. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1054-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
180. See Owen, supra note 176, at 379.
181. See id. at 404 (providing firearms as an example of such a manufactured product).
182. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).
On the other hand, there is no duty to warn about obvious risks or matters of common
knowledge. See Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (S.D. Fla.
2001); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984).
183. See Owen, supra note 176, at 383-84.
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under the Restatement’s ordinary consumer expectation test.184
The Products Liability Restatement has reiterated this approach.
For example, comment d to section 2 declares that “[c]ommon
and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages,
firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be
defective only upon proof of the requisite conditions in
Subsection (a), (b), or (c).”185 The comment further states that in
the absence of such proof, courts have not imposed liability upon
the sellers of such products “even if they pose substantial risks of
harm.”186 According to the Products Liability Restatement, this
more lenient treatment is justified because legislatures and
administrative agencies are better equipped to determine whether
any of these inherently dangerous products should be sold to the
public.187
Although most courts have accepted the Restatement’s
approach, some plaintiffs’ lawyers and legal commentators have
advocated that the manufacturers of inherently dangerous
products be held liable to injured consumers even though their
products are not defective. One of the more popular liability
theories is known as product category liability.188 According to
this concept, manufacturers can be held liable, even in the absence
of a conventional defect, if the accident costs that they generate
outweigh the benefits that the public derives from their use or

184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See generally Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the
Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. (1995); John L. Diamond, Eliminating the
“Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983); Ellen
Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994); Franklin E.
Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied
Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165 (2002); Michael J. Toke, Note,
Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment D Caveat
Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (1996).
Several commentators are critical of the theory. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Product
Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423 (1997); Harvey M. Grossman,
Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385 (1995);
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175.
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consumption.189 Although a few courts have endorsed product
category liability,190 most have rejected it.191
By definition, a specific inherently dangerous product has
dangerous attributes that cannot be reduced by a safer design or
by additional warnings.192 Therefore, a manufacturer cannot
make an inherently dangerous product safer by installing
additional safety devices.193 Nevertheless, there is another way
to reduce the costs to society of such a product. In theory, the
imposition of tort liability would increase the price of an
inherently dangerous product and, therefore, reduce
consumption.194 Less consumption, in turn, would result in fewer
accident costs associated with the products.195 On the other hand,
the present approach, which immunizes the manufacturers of
inherently dangerous products, causes the products to be cheaper,
increasing consumption and, therefore, increasing product-related
injuries.196 Thus, from a public-policy perspective, relieving the
manufacturer of liability for the sale of an inherently dangerous
product is analogous to relieving it of the duty to install a safety
device.

189. See Toke, supra note 188, at 1185.
190. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986)
(discussing asbestos); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (discussing
handguns); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (discussing aboveground swimming pools).
191. See Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing
cigarettes), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, reaff’d on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Roysdon
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing cigarettes);
Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing
firearms); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing firearms);
Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) (discussing cigarettes);
Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(discussing cigarettes), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674
F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing cigarettes); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987) (discussing firearms), aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing firearms);
Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (discussing alcoholic beverages).
192. Owen, supra note 176, at 380.
193. Id.
194. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175, at 1273.
195. James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability:
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1040 (1980).
196. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover
Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and
Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 104 (1994).
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F. Products with Obvious Hazards
At one time, consumers who exposed themselves to obvious
product-related risks did so at their own peril.197 According to the
patent danger rule, manufacturers had no duty to eliminate
obvious hazards by improving the design of their products.198
However, some courts criticized the patent danger rule as it
related to design defect claims,199 and it eventually fell out of
favor.200 Today, the obviousness of the danger is no longer
conclusive in design defect cases; instead, it serves simply as a
factor that the jury may take into account in evaluating a product’s
design.201
On the other hand, the vast majority of courts have
concluded that there is no duty to warn consumers about risks that
are open, obvious, or commonly known.202 Courts have offered
various justifications for this rule. In the first place, if a user or
consumer of a product is already aware of the risk, a warning
would be redundant and serve no useful purpose.203 In addition,
when a risk is obvious, it should follow that failure to warn about
it cannot be a cause-in-fact of any injury that results from
exposure to the hazard in question.
Finally, requiring
unnecessary warnings might vitiate the effectiveness of warnings
about non-obvious hazards.204
Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries205
provides a good illustration of how the obvious danger rule affects
a manufacturer’s duty to warn. In the case, the plaintiffs were
severely injured when they dove headfirst into a shallow, above197. See Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950); Bartkewich v. Billinger,
247 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1968).
198. See 2 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 10.2 (4th ed. 2014) (describing the “patent danger” rule).
199. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970) (en banc);
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 718-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
200. 2 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 198, § 10.3.
201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
202. See, e.g., Abney v. Crosman Corp., 919 So. 2d 289, 296 (Ala. 2005); Johnson v.
Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 911-12 (Cal. 2008); Greene v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 717
N.W.2d 855, 863 (Mich. 2006); Fitzgerald v. Fed. Signal Corp., 883 N.Y.S.2d 67, 67 (App.
Div. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j
(1998) (noting the rule).
203. See First Nat’l Bank & Trust v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682, 690 (7th
Cir. 2004).
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (1998).
205. 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992).
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ground swimming pool.206 Each plaintiff claimed that the product
was defective because the manufacturer failed to warn about the
risk of paralysis from diving into a shallow pool.207 The court
rejected the claims, declaring that the obvious nature of the
product’s danger served the same function as a warning and,
therefore, made an express warning unnecessary.208
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not complain that the
manufacturer had failed to warn about this particular danger.209
Despite this reasoning, the obvious danger rule, as it relates
to the duty to warn, may lead to a sub-optimal level of safety in
some cases. That is because a hazard that is obvious to an
ordinary consumer may not be obvious to all consumers. Young
children and persons with mental disabilities may not be able to
appreciate risks to the same extent as people of greater experience
or intelligence. However, these individuals might respond to a
warning about such “obvious” risks. By removing any incentive
to provide a warning in such cases, the obvious danger rule
enables a manufacturer to place a product on the market that is
not optimally safe.
G. Used Products
Generally speaking, used products are less safe than new
ones. One reason for this is that advances in safety technology
virtually ensure that older products will not be designed as well
as newer ones. In addition, older products will be less safe than
newer ones because of wear and tear and other forms of
deterioration.210 The effect of aging and obsolescent design is
particularly serious in the case of products such as motor vehicles,
airplanes, farm equipment, and industrial products like punch
presses, which are dangerous even when they are new. Given the
fact that used products are likely to be inherently less safe than
new products, one might expect courts to encourage accident cost
avoidance measures by product sellers by subjecting them to strict
liability. However, the opposite is true. Most states have rejected

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 223.
See id. at 217-219.
See id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 cmt. b (1998).
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strict liability and instead have subjected product sellers to a less
rigorous liability standard such as negligence.211
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.212 exemplifies the
majority approach. In the case, two children were struck by a sixyear-old motor vehicle while walking home from school.213 One
child was killed, and the other was severely injured.214 The car
was a used vehicle purchased a few months earlier from the
defendant car dealer.215 The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle was
defective for three reasons: (1) “[a] spring or springs in the left
front wheel braking system was missing at the time of its sale”;
(2) “[o]ne of the left rear brake shoes was completely worn out at
the time of the sale”; and (3) “[a] part of the cylinder braking
system in the left rear wheel was missing at the time of the
sale.”216 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s strict liability
claims, but an intermediate appellate court reversed.217
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that strict liability
is not applicable to the sellers of used products when they are
outside of the original production and marketing chain.218 The
court distinguished those who are part of the original marketing
chain, such as wholesalers and retailers, from used product
sellers.219 Unlike wholesalers and retailers, the court reasoned
that the sellers of used products had no ability to exert pressure
upon manufacturers to increase the safety of their products.220
Furthermore, the court declared that since the used car dealer in
this case did not create the risk, imposing strict liability upon the
dealer would make it an insurer for any risks that arose after the
211. See, e.g., Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1993),
aff’d, 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 1993); Keith v. Russell T. Bundy & Assocs., 495 So. 2d 1223,
1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781,
785 (Iowa 1987); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979). But see
Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 660 P.2d 1236, 1241
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 70 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975); Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D. 1983);
Hibbard ex rel Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Wis. 1991).
212. 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975).
213. Id. at 786.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 307 N.E.2d 729, 734-35 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1974), rev’d, 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975).
218. See Peterson, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
219. Id.
220. See id.
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vehicle left the manufacturer’s possession and while it was under
the control of one or more consumers.221 The court also rejected
the plaintiff’s contention that it should impose a duty on used car
dealers to inspect their vehicles for defects and to insure against
any defects that were not discoverable through a reasonable
inspection.222
For the most part, the Products Liability Restatement adopts
the majority position on this issue.223 The drafters set forth a
negligence standard as the general liability rule applicable to the
sale of used products.224 Strict liability is imposed only in cases
where the seller represents that the product is as safe as a new
product,225 where the product is remanufactured,226 or where the
seller has failed to comply with applicable governmental safety
standards.227
Assuming that a negligence standard does not provide the
same safety incentive to merchants that strict liability does, sellers
of used products will probably devote fewer resources to
inspections and maintenance under a negligence regime. This
may very well create a market for used products that are not
optimally safe. As Justice Goldenhersh pointed out in his dissent
in Peterson, the defects in the motor vehicle’s braking system
probably could have been discovered upon reasonable
inspection.228 Presumably, the used car dealer in the case would
have inspected the vehicle more carefully if he were subject to
strict liability.
H. Pharmaceutical Products
Pharmaceutical products include chemical drugs, biologics,
and medical devices. Chemical drugs are chemical compounds
that affect the human body through chemical means.229 The
FDA’s regulatory scheme distinguishes between prescription
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 (1998).
224. See id. § 8(a).
225. Id. § 8(b).
226. Id. § 8(c).
227. See id. § 8(d).
228. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ill. 1975)
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
229. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
363, 367 (2007).
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drugs and “over-the-counter” products.230 As might be expected,
prescription drugs are more strictly regulated and may only be
sold to patients who have obtained a prescription from their
physician.231 Over-the-counter drugs are considered to be less
dangerous, but they are still subject to regulation by the FDA.232
Biologics, such as vaccines and antibiotics, affect the body
through biological rather than chemical processes.233 They are
regulated by the FDA in much the same way as prescription
drugs.234 Medical devices are also subject to regulation by the
FDA, which distinguishes between three classes of devices based
on the degree of danger posed to the public.235
From the earliest days of modern products liability, special
liability rules have been applied to pharmaceutical products.
Various reasons explain this special treatment: (1) the chemical
composition of drugs cannot be changed to provide greater safety;
(2) their adverse effects cannot always be discovered prior to
marketing; (3) they are subject to strict regulation by the FDA;
(4) they have very high social utility; and (5) medical
practitioners, not ordinary consumers, decide which drugs their
patients should take.236
When the Restatement (Second) of Torts was first
promulgated, the drafters declared in comment k to section 402A
that “unavoidably unsafe” products were neither unreasonably
dangerous nor defective, even though they caused harm, as long
as their apparent utility outweighed their apparent risks and
proper warnings were given.237 Although the term “unavoidably
unsafe” was left undefined, the drafters provided several

230. See Prescription Drugs and Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drugs: Questions and
Answers,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resourcesforyou/consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100101.ht
m (last updated Sept. 3, 2013).
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. See Kyle Barrett, Note, Implementing the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act: Why Legal Principles Justify a Broad Definition of Biosimilarity, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (2012).
234. See id. at 1608.
235. Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 912 (1994).
236. See Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the
Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1999)
(noting these justifications).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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examples, all of which involved pharmaceutical products.238
Most courts and commentators accepted, at least to some degree,
this concept of limited liability for pharmaceutical products.239
However, some courts ruled that all prescription drugs were
entitled to automatic class-wide protection from claims of
defective design,240 while others were willing to consider whether
a drug came within the “unavoidably unsafe” description of
comment k on a case-by-case basis.241 A few jurisdictions
refused to adopt the approach at all.242 However, over the years,
courts have characterized a variety of pharmaceutical products as
“unavoidably unsafe” and have applied comment k’s provisions
to most types of pharmaceutical products, including chemical
drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, blood, and medical devices.243 At the
same time, judges refused to extend the principle articulated in
comment k to non-medical products such as golf carts or concrete
mix.244
In 1998, the drafters of the Products Liability Restatement
included a provision that specifically addressed the issue of
liability for the manufacturers of pharmaceutical products.245
Section 6(d) subjects pharmaceutical manufacturers to liability
for inadequate warnings only if: (1) reasonable warnings are not
provided to prescribing physicians or other health care providers
who are in a position to reduce the risk of harm or (2) the warnings
238. See id.
239. See Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Reasoning
and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985).
240. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg
v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991).
241. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989); Toner v.
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 309 (Idaho 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374,
383 (N.J. 1984); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
242. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1981).
243. See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing
vaccines); Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing
prescription drugs); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337-1339 (9th Cir. 1985)
(discussing an intrauterine device); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230 (4th Cir.
1984) (discussing a cardiac pacemaker); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 229
(8th Cir. 1983) (discussing prescription drugs); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v.
Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 125-26 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (discussing blood); Feldman, 479 A.2d
at 383 (discussing antibiotics).
244. See Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977) (en banc);
Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 186 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Wis. 1971).
245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998). The
Products Liability Restatement treats manufacturing defects for prescription drugs and
medical devices in the same manner as it treats other products. See Lars Noah, This Is Your
Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 841 (2009).
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are not provided to the patient when the manufacturer knows or
should know that a health-care provider will not be available to
reduce the risk to the patient.246 Section 6(c) declares that a
prescription drug or medical device is defectively designed only
if its foreseeable risks “are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any
class of patients.”247
Comment b to section 6 declares that under section 6(c), “a
drug is defectively designed only when it provides no net benefit
to any class of patients.”248 Comment b goes on to state that
defective design will be found when “the drug or device ha[s] so
little merit compared with its risks that reasonable health-care
providers, possessing knowledge of risks that were known or
reasonably should have been known, would not have prescribed
the drug or device for any class of patients.”249 The comment
continues, “a prescription drug or medical device that has
usefulness to any class of patients is not defective in design even
if it is harmful to other patients.”250
Needless to say, this approach has proved to be very
controversial.251 Under this formulation, an injured party cannot
prove that a prescription drug or medical device is defectively
designed by showing that a safer alternative was available.252
Drug A would not be considered defective even though a
competitor, Drug B, was available and had the same therapeutic
benefits but had fewer adverse side effects. Under the Products
Liability Restatement’s approach, the fact that Drug B was a
better product would not mean that Drug A should not also be
marketed.
Only a few cases have ruled on this provision, and the results
have been mixed. A small number of courts have either expressly

246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d).
247. Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added).
248. Id. § 6 cmt. b (emphasis added).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See generally George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for
Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737 (2002).
252. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2000).
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adopted section 6(c) or have mentioned it favorably in passing.253
For example, a federal district court, in Madsen v. American
Home Products Corp.,254 concluded that Iowa courts would apply
section 6(c) in a prescription drug design defect case. 255 In the
case, the plaintiff alleged that she had contracted valvular heart
disease as a result of taking fen-phen for five months.256 She
claimed, inter alia, that the drug was defectively designed.257
Granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show that no reasonable
health-care provider would prescribe the drug for any class of
patients.258
In contrast, several courts have rejected the approach of
section 6(c) and instead have elected to retain section 402A’s
comment k formula. Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.259
reflects this view. The plaintiff in Freeman developed multiple
health problems after taking the drug Accutane to treat chronic
acne.260 She brought suit against the drug’s manufacturer, relying
on various theories of recovery.261 Her design defect claim
alleged that the risks inherent in the drug’s design outweighed its
benefits.262 A lower court dismissed her suit, and she appealed.263
In deciding whether to reinstate the plaintiff’s design defect
claim, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to choose between the
comment k and section 6(c) approaches.264 After reviewing some
of the criticisms that had been made against section 6(c), the
Nebraska court concluded that “recovery would be nearly
impossible” under the Product Liability Restatement’s
approach.265 Instead, the court determined that comment k

253. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(discussing anti-reflux prosthesis); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361
n.11 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (discussing a bone-screw device); Sita v. Danek Med. Inc., 43 F. Supp.
2d 245, 256 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing a bone-screw device).
254. 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Mo 2004).
255. Id. at 1037.
256. Id. at 1028-29.
257. Id. at 1029.
258. Id. at 1037.
259. 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
260. Id. at 832.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 833.
263. Id. at 832.
264. Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 840.
265. Id.
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applied to drug-related design defects and held that the plaintiff’s
design defect claim should go forward on that theory.266
The Products Liability Restatement’s approach represents a
tradeoff between drug safety and other concerns. One such
concern is the need to protect licensing decisions by the FDA
from collateral attacks in the form of lawsuits against
pharmaceutical companies.267 In addition, it is necessary that new
drugs be developed as quickly as possible so they may be made
available to the public.268 Although there is some debate about
the effectiveness of the FDA’s licensing process, there is no doubt
that the agency has a high degree of expertise in the area of drug
safety.269 For this reason, the courts have shown considerable
willingness to shield the FDA’s licensing decisions and
regulatory policies by preempting certain types of design defect
and failure-to-warn suits against drug manufacturers.270
Regulatory compliance statutes in some states also protect FDA
decision making—albeit less effectively than federal
preemption.271
IV. TRADEOFFS BETWEEN PRODUCT SAFETY AND
OTHER SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the Product Liability
Restatement’s risk-utility balancing test allows courts and juries
to make tradeoffs between product safety and other
considerations, particularly where product design is at issue. In
addition, there are a number of specific doctrines that protect
manufacturers against liability for the marketing of products that
may not be optimally safe. This portion of the article identifies
some of the societal objectives that compete with, and sometimes
trump, product safety. These social goals include personal
autonomy and consumer choice, product cost and performance,

266. Id. at 840-41.
267. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2165 (2000).
268. See Steven Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism
Dominate the Future?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 26 (2007) (“[F]aster access to new
drugs has been an increasingly popular position for decades.”).
269. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different,
111 YALE L.J. 151, 162 n.41 (2001).
270. See Mut. Pharma. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476-77 (2013).
271. See 2 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 198, § 14.6.
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the protection of product sellers, and the protection of third
parties.
A. Personal Autonomy and Consumer Choice
1. Personal Autonomy
The principle of personal autonomy assumes that individuals
should have the power to make meaningful choices without
having to justify them to others.272 The moral right to make such
choices is grounded on the unique capacity of human beings to
reason and to act according to normative principles.273 Respect
for the right of personal autonomy is deeply rooted in American
culture, as well as in American political and legal institutions.274
Risk-taking is an important aspect of the exercise of personal
autonomy.275 Risk-seekers are likely to engage in dangerous
activities such as hang gliding, bungee jumping, skydiving, or
mountain climbing. They also prefer to ride motorcycles without
a helmet in states where this is permitted. Risk-avoiders, on the
other hand, prefer to live more sedated, and possibly longer, lives.
It is important to note, however, that a high tolerance for risk is
not necessarily based on emotion alone. In many cases, a riskseeker may have a well-founded belief that he or she is better able
to deal with a particular risk than the average person.276
Product liability law’s approach to optional safety
equipment is consistent with consumers’ autonomy-based right to
voluntarily encounter risks.277 Safety equipment adds to a
product’s cost and may adversely affect its performance or
functionality.278 This is particularly true of some of the annoying
gadgets found on modern automobiles. It is not surprising,
therefore, that some consumers would prefer to do without these
features, even though the resulting product is more dangerous

272. See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 395 (1996).
273. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 8 (1982).
274. See Berger, supra note 5, at 26.
275. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 781, 782 (2009); see also Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and
Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation
Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006).
276. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175, at 1321.
277. Ausness, supra note 147, at 823.
278. Geistfeld, supra note 275, at 786.
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than it would otherwise be.279 Safety is literally optional to the
extent that manufacturers are allowed to offer safety features as
optional, rather than as standard equipment. In the case of
ordinary consumer products, the primary justifications for this
rule are personal autonomy and consumer choice.280 Just as
individuals are permitted to engage in risky activities, within
reason they are allowed to embrace danger by declining to
purchase safer products. Personal autonomy is an important
interest and the rules concerning optional equipment support this
interest by permitting manufacturers to make safety optional as
long as they fully disclose to consumers the risks and choices that
are available.
The principle of personal autonomy also guides the law’s
treatment of inherently dangerous products. Many of these
products such as cigarettes, fast food, alcoholic beverages,
trampolines, all-terrain vehicles, hang-gliders, and above-ground
swimming pools are not essential to human welfare.
Nevertheless, despite their dangerous character, the principle of
personal autonomy suggests that people should be free to
purchase them and manufacturers should not held liable for
placing these products into the stream of commerce.281 Clearly,
society values, or at least tolerates, the public’s right to consume
or utilize inherently dangerous products and thereby expose
themselves to the unavoidable risks associated with them.
Finally, personal autonomy may also support imposing a
negligence standard on used product sellers instead of subjecting
them to strict liability. If strict liability were imposed on used
product sellers, their products would be safer, but more
expensive, because of the additional measures the seller would
have to take in order to avoid liability.282 On the other hand,
imposing a negligence standard on these sellers allows them to
sell their goods more cheaply.283 This in turn enables those
consumers who are willing to accept greater risk to purchase a
used product instead of paying more for a new, safer one. In other

279. See id. at 797.
280. See id. at 798.
281. Of course, manufacturers may be liable to injured consumers if they are guilty of
fraud or failure to warn, or if they engage in unethical marketing practices.
282. See Antonio J. Senagore, The Benefits of Limiting Strict Liability for UsedProduct Sellers, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 349, 373 (2010).
283. Id. at 378.
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words, consumers can subject themselves to a greater risk of
injury in order to have more money to spend on other things.
2. Consumer Choice
Consumer choice is closely related to personal autonomy
because the right to make choices is illusory if there are no
meaningful choices available.284 However, consumer choice can
also be justified on utilitarian grounds. In order for individuals to
allocate resources in a way that maximizes their utility, they must
be able to choose from a wide variety of goods and services.285
Producers respond to this demand from consumers by offering a
range of products that vary significantly in terms of quality,
appearance, performance, convenience, and safety. It follows,
therefore, that some products will be safer than others. Motor
vehicles provide a good example of this phenomenon. Low-end
vehicles typically have fewer safety features than more expensive
ones, yet consumers still choose to purchase them.286 On the
other hand, risk-adverse individuals are free to purchase a more
expensive model that is equipped with such safety devices as antilock brakes, rearview cameras, side airbags, blind-spot monitors,
and the like.287
Consumer choice may also support the view that consumers
should have access to inherently dangerous products, even when
safer alternatives are available. An obvious example of this is
food and drink. Consumers can choose to eat healthy foods, such
as lean meats, whole-grain products, and fruits and vegetables, or
they can choose to consume tasty, but less healthy, fare, such as
hamburgers, chili dogs, pizza, and sugary soft drinks. Perhaps the
same is true of alcoholic beverages, although some might say that
iced tea is a poor substitute for a dry martini. In any event, the
consumer-choice rationale supports consumers’ right to choose

284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998)
(noting the drafters of the Products Liability Restatement approved of consumer choice in
considering the defective design of products).
285. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1980).
286. See Geistfeld, supra note 21, at 123.
287. See Pierce, supra note 285, at 1283. By the same token, risk-adverse consumers
may prefer to pay for safety features that are not cost-effective from a risk-utility point of
view. In the case of big-ticket items like automobiles, there may be a niche market for ultrasafe models for this class of consumers. Wealthy, older consumers are likely a prime
demographic for this apparent over-investment in product safety.
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whatever products they want, not just products that are good for
them.
The practice of allowing manufacturers to offer some forms
of safety equipment on an optional basis also ensures that
products will be available to a wide range of consumers. Many
of these consumers consider some safety features to be
unnecessary, inconvenient, or too expensive. Providing safety
features as optional, rather than standard, equipment allows
consumers to decide which safety features they want or do not
want, depending upon their intended use of the product. Finally,
the imposition of a negligence standard, instead of strict liability,
on the sellers of used products, enables them to sell their goods
more cheaply. This provides consumers with more choices by
enabling them to purchase cheaper, but less safe, used products if
they prefer to do so.
B. Product Cost and Performance
Many of the doctrines discussed above subordinate product
safety to some degree in order to achieve lower product cost or
better product performance. Product “cost,” in this context, refers
to the price that a retail consumer must pay to purchase a
particular product. If manufacturers try to achieve greater product
safety by equipping their products with safety devices, either
because they are required to do so by government regulation or to
avoid potential tort liability, they will have to charge more for
these products.
Although public policy may support higher prices, in order
to lower consumption of some products, such as cigarettes, in
most cases it is preferable that prices of consumer goods be lower
rather than higher. There are several reasons that society prefers
lower-cost goods. First, if product prices are relatively high,
poorer consumers will not be able to afford them. Excessively
high prices for food and other necessities can cause serious social
unrest. Second, in a consumption-oriented economy, the nation’s
economic prosperity is dependent on maintaining a healthy level
of public consumption. Finally, if safety costs increase the price
of a product, consumers may turn to cheaper, but more dangerous,
substitutes.288

288. See Henderson, supra note 195, at 1040 (noting this tendency).
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Increased safety may also affect product availability. When
a certain level of safety is required by government regulation or
by tort law, manufacturers may simply get out of the market and
turn to the production of other products. This apparently occurred
some years ago with childhood vaccines289 and general aviation
aircraft.290 In both cases, Congress felt compelled to pass
legislation encouraging manufacturers to produce these products
again.291
Sometimes tradeoffs must also be made between product
safety and product performance. Product performance is
concerned with how well a product performs its intended
function. It includes such considerations as efficiency of
operation, costs of maintenance and operation, reliability,
durability, convenience, and even aesthetics. However, some
safety devices significantly impair product performance, such as
safety guards on punch presses, radial power saws, or similar
products. Likewise, roll-over protection devices and seat belts
may also adversely affect the performance and versatility of
products such as forklifts, tractors, and farm equipment.
The contract specification defense encourages better product
performance by enabling purchasers to obtain custom-designed
products without having to accept features, including safety
features, they do not want. This not only increases the number of
possible options available to purchasers, but it also allows them
to decide how much safety they want. Thus, the appropriate level
of safety, at least in the case of custom-designed products, is left
to the discretion of consumers rather than this being imposed
upon them by others. Economic efficiency may also provide
some support for the contract specification doctrine because it
enables purchasers with superior risk-avoidance skills to avoid
having to pay for safety devices that they do not need.

289. See Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 351 (2011).
290. See Scott David Smith, Note, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994:
The Initial Necessity for, Outright Success of, and Continued Need for the Act to Maintain
American General Aviation Predominance Throughout the World, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 75, 77-78 (2009).
291. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2 to -33
(2012); General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994) (amended
1997).
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C. The Protection of Significant Governmental Policies
and Interests
In some instances, product safety must be balanced against
important governmental policies and interests. These policies and
interests are typically expressed or implied in either federal
statutes or agency regulations. For example, statutes and
regulations may be enacted in order to impose a uniform
regulatory standard throughout the country. This approach often
reflects a view by Congress or a federal regulatory agency that the
economic or administrative benefits of uniform regulatory
standards outweigh the marginal benefits of any stricter safety
requirements that may be imposed under state law. For example,
in Cipollone,292 the United States Supreme Court declared that
one of the objectives of the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act was to “protect[] the national economy from the
burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations.”293 Thus, the Court
concluded that the states could not impose stricter labeling
requirements, either by direct regulation or by judicial decision,
on cigarette manufacturers.294
Another important regulatory goal is the protection of
agency decision-making from second-guessing by juries. This
issue has arisen on several occasions in connection with the
FDA’s approval of particular warning language on prescription
drug labeling. For example, in Wyeth v. Levine,295 the defendant
drug company argued that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim
should be preempted on actual conflict grounds because Congress
intended “to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling
decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives.”296
Although the Court rejected this argument in Wyeth, it has shown
a greater willingness to protect the FDA’s decision-making
process in other cases.297
The courts have also acknowledged the need to protect the
federal government’s design decisions against collateral attacks
292. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
293. Id. at 514.
294. See id. at 524.
295. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
296. Id. at 573.
297. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013); PLIVA, Inc.
v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011).
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by injured military personnel and others. Thus, in Boyle,298 the
Court invoked the government contractor defense to shield the
manufacturer of a helicopter from tort liability when its design
had been dictated by procurement officials to meet specific
military needs, even though a safer design was possible.299 In the
case, the Court expressed concern that manufacturers of military
hardware might be deterred from contracting with the government
out of fear that they would be subject to damage claims from
injured military personnel.300
A fourth federal interest is that of protecting particular
economic activities or geographic areas of the country from the
adverse effects of aggressive state regulatory action, including the
imposition of tort liability on product sellers. This principle was
reflected in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
with which the Cipollone majority balanced the public-health
objectives against the goal of protecting the tobacco industry and
the economic interests of tobacco-producing states from stricter
regulation of cigarette labeling by other jurisdictions.301
Congress was evidently motivated by similar concerns, as the
Court noted in Geier,302 when it concluded that a DOT regulation
that mandated the gradual introduction of airbags preempted a
“no airbag” claim against a car manufacturer by an injured
consumer.303
Finally, the federal government may need to protect its own
financial interests at the expense of greater product safety. At
least one doctrine, although nominally aimed at protecting
product sellers, is actually intended to protect the interests of the
federal government, albeit indirectly. The doctrine in question is
the government contractor defense. When the government
formulates designs and specifications for a product, it is usually
not liable to injured parties because of its sovereign immunity.304
However, as the United States Supreme Court pointed out in
Boyle, the government will be indirectly liable if an accident
298. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
299. Id. at 503, 512. The Court remanded the case to the appellate court for a
clarification as to whether the evidence would support a verdict in favor of the defendant
since the government contractor defense applied. Id. at 513-14.
300. See id. at 507.
301. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-14 (1992).
302. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
303. Id. at 886.
304. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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victim can sue its contractor, since the contractor will take its
potential tort liability into account when it bids on a contract.305
The government contractor defense enables the government to
sacrifice safety for other objectives without having to pay more
for the products that it orders from private contractors.306 This is
particularly significant in military procurement cases because the
federal government must often balance safety against cost or
military effectiveness when it develops designs for products to
meet its military needs.307
D. Protection of Product Sellers
A number of doctrines are intended to provide manufacturers
and other product sellers with a safe harbor against claims that
their products are not optimally safe. These include federal
preemption, the contract specification doctrine, and the regulatory
compliance doctrine. One reason to protect product sellers is that
massive tort liability may bankrupt them, causing harm to
employees, shareholders, creditors, and the communities where
these products were produced. The experience of the asbestos
industry showed that this risk is not illusory.308 The economic
influence of other industries makes them “too big to fail” and,
therefore, arguably justifies the creation of doctrines that limit
their liability for the sale of products that may be sub-optimally
safe.
Cigarette companies, firearms manufacturers, and
purveyors of fast food are examples of such industries. Finally,
courts or legislatures may want to protect product sellers to ensure
the availability of essential and highly beneficial products. The
special treatment accorded by the Products Liability Restatement
to vaccines and prescription drugs reflects this policy.309

305. Id. at 511-12.
306. See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075, 1093 (1996).
307. See, e.g., Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1976) (deferring to the Army’s judgment that seat belts on a vehicle would interfere with its
combat effectiveness).
308. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for
Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 210
(2003).
309. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned doctrines and defenses reflect
compromises between optional safety and other interests. In most
cases, these compromises appear to be fully justified.
Nevertheless, sometimes it might be possible to tweak them a bit
to improve the level of product safety without interfering with
other important societal interests. For example, if the courts wish
to shift the balance in favor of product safety in the case of federal
preemption, they could treat the “presumption against
preemption”310 as a clear-statement rule and refuse to find
preemption unless Congress makes its intent to preempt clear.311
This would lead to fewer products liability cases being
preempted, thereby arguably increasing product safety.
By protecting a manufacturer from liability, the contract
specification defense provides more leeway to the purchaser to
obtain the design features he or she wants.312 However, it also
creates an externality problem when others, such as employees of
the purchaser, are forced to bear the risks associated with unsafe
designs. One solution would be to modify the exclusive- remedy
rule of workers’ compensation law and allow injured workers to
recover against their employers in cases where design
specifications provided by the employer are substantially unsafe.
A similar negative externality problem exists when employers
purchase off-the-shelf equipment for commercial use. When
safety equipment is optional, employers may be tempted to save
money by declining to purchase safety equipment because they
are not exposed to risks associated with placing dangerous
products in the workplace. Yet again, the solution may be to
restrict the exclusive-remedy rule in such cases.
Turning to the government contractor defense, the
requirements set forth in Boyle for that doctrine provide a fair
degree of assurance that government officials will consciously

310. The presumption against preemption states that the states’ historic police powers
should not be superseded by federal legislation unless Congress expresses a clear and
manifest purpose to do so. See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1219 (2010).
311. See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety
Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 971
(2004); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1429 (1998).
312. See Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129, 133-34 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
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balance safety considerations against other national interests.313
Nevertheless, a higher level of safety might be achieved if the
defense was limited to the procurement of military equipment and
not applied to products that are not specifically designed for
military use. Of course, this would require the United States
Supreme Court to reconsider the Boyle decision and shift the
rationale of the government contractor defense from the
discretionary function doctrine to the Feres rule.314
In addition, courts could change the obvious hazard rule
from a “no duty” rule to one that raises a presumption that a
warning is not required in obvious hazard situations. Plaintiffs
could then overcome this presumption by proving the existence
of special circumstances. In the case of used products, it would
be useful for state legislatures or administrative agencies to
impose a duty to inspect safety equipment, such as brakes, on
certain products.
Due to the heavily regulated nature of prescription drugs and
medical devices, tort law can probably do little to increase the
safety of these products without unduly infringing upon the
FDA’s regulatory authority. However, it may be possible to
increase product safety by expediting and simplifying the process
of strengthening warning labels in response to new information
about product risks that arises after a drug or medical device is
approved for marketing by the FDA. In addition, the FDA could
require the producers of generic drugs to update their labeling in
response to new information about side effects or other productrelated risks.
In conclusion, various doctrines and defenses protect
manufacturers from liability even though their products are not
particularly safe. While this state of affairs would seem to be at
odds with the safety goals of modern products liability law, it may
in fact be defensible. Safety is a desirable objective, but it is not
necessarily an absolute priority. Instead, other values and
objectives, such as personal autonomy and consumer choice,
product cost, and product performance may trump safety goals.

313. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
314. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). The Court in Feres held
that military personnel could not sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for service-related injuries. Id.; see also Ausness, supra note 126, at 990-91 (discussing
the rule).
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Nevertheless, it may be possible to adjust some of these doctrines
and defenses slightly to enhance consumer protection.

